Citation

Song S. Soc. Epistomiol. 2021; 35(2): 160-172.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2021, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/02691728.2020.1839811

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article argues that some denialists of Japan's military sexual slavery are responsible for past epistemic injustices. In the literature on epistemic responsibility, backward- and forward-looking justifications of responsibility are rarely distinguished. Moreover, notions of epistemic responsibility are mostly forward-looking. To fill the gap in the literature, this article offers a notion of backward-looking epistemic responsibility by arguing that some morally responsible agents who committed epistemic injustices are liable to make epistemic amends for past epistemic injustices. The article proceeds as follows. I introduce Japan's military sexual slavery and how it is denied in two ways (state-led denial and individual-led denial). Both types of denial may involve epistemic injustices. Based on moral responsibility, I argue that some agents are liable to make epistemic amends for past epistemic injustices. I then offer three conditions to discern who is liable, which are conditions of causality, autonomy and epistemic competence. I apply my notion of backward-looking epistemic responsibility to Japan's military sexual slavery and highlight its limits. Finally, I provide a concept of acknowledgment as a process of making epistemic amends.

Language: en

Keywords

acknowledgment; denial; epistemic injustice; Japan’s military sexual slavery; liability