Citation

Tang T, Guo Y, Zhang G, Wang H, Shi Q. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020; 17(22): e8457.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, MDPI: Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute)

DOI

10.3390/ijerph17228457

PMID

33203158

Abstract

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis method is developed in this study to understand the interactions between cyclists' traffic violations and the enforcement strategies. The evolutionary equilibrium stabilities were analysed under a fixed (FPS) and a dynamic penalty strategy (DPS). The simulation-based numerical experiments show that: (i) the proposed method can be used to study the interactions between traffic violations and the enforcement strategies; (ii) FPS and DPS can reduce cyclists' probability of committing traffic violations when the perceived traffic violations' relative benefit is less than the traffic violation penalty and the enforcement cost is less than the enforcement benefit, and using DPS can yield a stable enforcement outcome for law enforcement compared to using FPS; and (iii) strategy-related (penalty amount, enforcement effectiveness, and enforcement cost) and attitudinal factors (perceived relative benefit, relative public image cost, and cyclists' attitude towards risk) can affect the enforcement strategy's impacts on reducing cyclists' traffic violations.

Language: en

Keywords

cyclists; traffic violations; cumulative prospect theory; enforcement strategy; evolutionary game theory