Citation

Danaher J. Soc. Theory Pract. 2020; 46(3): 467-496.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, Florida State University Center for Social Philosophy)

DOI

10.5840/soctheorpract202042293

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article argues that access to meaningful sexual experience should be included within the set of the goods that are subject to principles of distributive justice. It argues that some people are currently unjustly excluded from meaningful sexual experience and it is not implausible to suggest that they might thereby have certain claim rights to sexual inclusion. This does not entail that anyone has a right to sex with another person, but it does entail that duties may be imposed on society to foster greater sexual inclusion. This is a controversial thesis and this article addresses this controversy by engaging with four major objections to it: the misogyny objection; the impossibility objection; the stigmatisation objection; and the unjust social engineering objection.

Language: en