Citation

Henke A, Hsu L. Rev. Econ. Househ. 2020; 18(2): 413-429.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1007/s11150-020-09483-1

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Two theories of intimate partner violence (IPV) have differing predictions on how women's bargaining power affects rates of IPV. If an abuser enjoys and "pays" for IPV (expressive violence), bargaining power reduces rates of IPV. But if violence is a tool to increase bargaining power in the household (instrumental violence), a woman's bargaining power may increase IPV. The existing evidence suggests that bargaining power decreases IPV on net. One way to reconcile these theories with the evidence is that both types of violence exist, and bargaining power especially reduces expressive violence. Using local variation in temperature, IPV police reports, and women's labor market outcomes, we identify three key effects which together support this theory. First, we identify temperature-based violence as a type of expressive violence. Second, we find new evidence that a woman's labor market opportunities shield her from IPV. Finally, we combine these analyses to show that a woman's labor market opportunities specifically insulate her from temperature-based violence, providing evidence that bargaining power best protects women against expressive violence.

Language: en