Citation

Feyyaz M. Dyn. Asymm. Confl. 2020; 13(1): 24-46.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/17467586.2019.1630745

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The central hypothesis of this article is that there are a large number of terrorist groups which prolifically employ strategic communication (stratcom), while paradoxically, there are others who markedly underutilize it, and therefore, fail to mobilize support for the professed cause. The decisive determinant for either of the two ends, it is argued, obtains in the intellectual endowment or its banality among the conspiratorial groupings. A case of stratcom by two leading Pakistani Taliban groups - Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and TTP - Jammat ul Ahrar - is systematically investigated. The analysis clearly engenders that these terrorist organizations are communication un-savvy, because, they are not only religiously and secularly less informed and increasingly rhetorical but are intellectually far less creative to articulate a people inspired rhetorical vision. The brutalization of the civilians further trivializes their discourses. They have thus largely failed to evoke meaningful social mobilization. Besides further elaborating on the findings, the conclusion reflects on a few limitations of the research, offers input for broadening the research scope of some of the key dimensions of terrorism literature and ends with the discussion on some policy implications.

Language: en

Keywords

master narratives; narrative rationality; Pakistani Taliban; Strategic communication; terrorist organizations