Citation

Denney E, Pai G, Whiteside I. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Safety 2019; 191: e106502.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2019, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.ress.2019.106502

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

We develop a notion of safety architecture (SA), based on an extension to Bow Tie Diagrams (BTDs), to characterize the overall scope of the mitigation measures undertaken to provide safety assurance at both design time and during operations. We motivate the need for SAs, whilst also illustrating their application and utility in the context of aviation systems, through an example based upon a safety case for an unmanned aircraft system mission that successfully underwent regulatory scrutiny. We elaborate how SAs fit into our overall safety assurance methodology, also discussing the key role they play in conjunction with structured assurance arguments to provide a more comprehensive basis for the associated safety case. We give a formal semantics as a basis for implementing both BTDs and SAs in our assurance case tool, AdvoCATE, describing the functionality afforded to support both the related safety analysis and subsequent development activities, e.g., enforcement of well-formedness properties, computation of residual risk, and model-based views and transformations.

Language: en

Keywords

Argument structures; Assurance; Barrier models; Bow tie diagrams; Safety architecture; Safety case; Safety system; Unmanned aircraft systems