Citation

Blackshaw BP, Rodger D. J. Med. Ethics 2020; ePub(ePub): ePub.

Affiliation

Allied Health Sciences, London South Bank University School of Health and Social Care, London, UK.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, BMJ Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1136/medethics-2020-106173

PMID

32253364

Abstract

Prabhpal Singh has recently defended a relational account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns as a way of explaining why abortion is permissible and infanticide is not. He claims that only a newborn can stand in a parent-child relation, not a fetus, and this relation has a moral dimension that bestows moral value. We challenge Singh's reasoning, arguing that the case he presents is unconvincing. We suggest that the parent-child relation is better understood as an extension of an existing relationship formed during the gestational period. The change in this relation at birth is not sufficient to justify the radical change in moral status required to rule out infanticide while accepting the permissibility of abortion. Given that the moral status of orphans is also problematic under Singh's account, we conclude that Singh has not shown that a newborn has greater moral worth than a fetus.

© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.

Language: en

Keywords

abortion; embryos and fetuses; infanticide; moral status; newborns and minors