Citation

Jarvis T. Confl. Secur. Dev. 2020; 20(1): 165-189.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, Kings College, Center for Defence Studies, Publisher Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/14678802.2019.1705073

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The peace-building literature widely frames corruption as a threat to the stability of states transitioning from armed conflict. Underlying this framing are liberal assumptions on the institutions required for long-term stability, to which corruption is seen as necessarily detrimental. In this article, I add to an emergent literature critical of this framing by examining the long-term impacts of corruption on local-level stability in Ghorahi, Nepal. Drawing on a new dataset of 89 interviews, I demonstrate the stabilising consequences of corruption on two key aspects of Nepal's post-2006 transition. First, I show that elite-level corruption arising from the transformation of the Maoist insurgency into the political mainstream has inadvertently contributed to the social reintegration of rank and file ex-combatants. Second, I show how a corrupt elite network in local government contributed to the cooperation between political parties - including the emerging post-conflict Maoist party. These elements broaden the evidence for the stabilising consequences of corruption, which is largely focused on the effects of elite-led patronage and coping economies during episodes of conflict.

Language: en

Keywords

Corruption; demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); disarmament; governance reform; illiberal peace-building; Nepal; social reintegration