Citation

Nanes M. J. Peace Res. 2020; 57(2): 329-343.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2020, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022343319866901

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

How does the demographic makeup of the police affect violent conflict in divided societies? I argue that following a shift in relative group power, integrating the police rank-and-file addresses incentives to rebel by solving a commitment problem between the powerful state and a weaker group. I test this argument using a survey experiment of 800 Baghdad residents. Providing Sunni (minority) respondents with an informational prime that the police are integrated reduces support for anti-government violence. Consistent with the commitment mechanism, Sunnis, but not Shias, who receive the prime are less fearful of future repression by the government. The key mechanism is the way in which officers are distributed. It is more difficult for the state to renege on inclusion when minority officers serve in mixed units rather than being isolated in minority-only units. Patrol-level heterogeneity makes it difficult for the government to withhold equipment or information from officers on the basis of group identity, and makes the state reliant on officers from all groups to serve all parts of the country. Among survey respondents in Baghdad, I find that those who perceive the police as mixed between Sunnis and Shias, but not those who perceive officers to be primarily members of their own sect, are less expectant that the government will try to harm them. This article contributes to research on institutions in divided societies by identifying a form of inclusion which is self-enforcing, improving long-term prospects for peace by resolving underlying insecurities in the shadow of historical conflict.

Language: en