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Journal Article

Citation

Wheeler SC. Public Aff. Q. 1997; 11(4): 431-443.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The notion of an absolute right to self-defense runs into some serious problems with the logical structure of absolute rights. For almost any right, one is usually able to construct a sequence of cases such that there is no ethically significant difference between successive elements of the sequence, but the first element is clearly a case where the right exists and the last case is one where ascription of the right is absurd. Since it seems to be part of the concept of rights that two ethically indistinguishable cases must be treated alike, such results are paradoxical.

This paper proposes another way to think about rights and applies it to the arguments for a right to self-defense with deadly force. In particular, it will show that a popular sorites argument against such rights is unsound.

The paper argues that there are some clear cases where a person has a right to use deadly force in self-defense. Such cases are independent of the guilt or innocence of the assailant, are not punishment, and establish a prima facie liberty to prepare oneself for such exigencies. The existence of this right, however, depends on its not being over-ridden by conflicting rights. Whether such over-riding takes place is a matter of particular factors in the situation, not a matter of principles in hierarchy.

Given that such rights only exist when they do not conflict with countervailing rights, however, the sorites arguments which lead to the alleged right to own bazookas, 20mm cannons, and heat- seeking missiles do not succeed, given current circumstances.

Let me begin by examining some well-known features of rights which seem to distinguish rights from other kinds of considerations which we use in determining what we ought to do:

Rights can be over-ridden by considerations of utility, in the sense that there are situations where one ought to take actions which violate rights. But rights persevere when over-ridden by utility. The over-riding by utility leaves a situation where a right has been violated and compensation is owed...


Language: en

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