Citation

Kamei K. Econ. Lett. 2018; 171: 193-197.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper presents results from a prisoner's dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player's action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma's incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.

Language: en

Keywords

Cooperation; Dilemma; Experiment; Social norms; Third party punishment