Citation

Kim JY. Econ. Lett. 2018; 167: 112-114.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.003

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.

Language: en

Keywords

International conflict; Military technology; Preventive attack; Security threats; Stalemate