Citation

Hechler S, Kessler T. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2018; 76: 270-282.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.005

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Moral violations seem to elicit moral outrage because of the wrongfulness of the deed. However, recent studies have questioned the existence of moral outrage, because moral violations are confounded with the harm done to victims. Such harm elicits empathic anger rather than moral outrage (Batson et al., 2007; Batson et al., 2009). Thus, moral outrage is triggered by the wrongfulness of an action (i.e., a perpetrator's intention to harm), whereas empathic anger is triggered by its harmfulness (i.e., the actual harm done). Four studies (N = 1065) in varying contexts orthogonally crossed these antecedents of anger to differentiate between moral outrage and empathic anger. The results demonstrate that anger mainly emerged from the intention to harm, rather than the actual harm done. In contrast, the actual harm elicited empathy with victims. The findings suggest that anger about moral violations emerges separately from empathic reactions, although these reactions are difficult to distinguish in most instances. Likewise, the intention to harm provoked a willingness to punish the perpetrator much more than the actual harm did. Moral violations thus elicit moral outrage independently of their harmful consequences, even though such anger may often overlap with concern for others.

Language: en

Keywords

Anger; Emotions; Empathy; Morality; Retaliation