Citation

Brinkmann S. Integr. Psychol. Behav. Sci. (New York) 2018; 52(2): 177-190.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1007/s12124-018-9421-2

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Much theorizing in psychology and related disciplines begins with a given model of the mind that is then applied in research projects to study concrete phenomena. Sometimes psychological research can be theory-driven in quite an explicit way, approaching the logic of the hypothetico-deductive method. Others reject this and prefer to work inductively, and, in the extreme case of positivism, perhaps try to avoid theorizing altogether. In this article I shall suggest another way to think of the relationship between psychological theories and psychological phenomena. My suggestion is not simply to replace the hypothetico-deductive model with an inductive one, but to argue that the most direct route to theories of the human mind that grasp its complexity is to begin with the Kantian question of transcendental philosophy: X exists - how is X possible? In the context of this article, I apply this questioning to the phenomenon of grief: Grief exists - what general psychological theory of the mind do we need in order to account for its possibility? I attempt to extract three general psychological points from the existence of grief, viz. (1) the deep relationality of the self, (2) the limitations of evolutionary accounts, and (3) the normativity of psychological phenomena. I shall argue that these are general psychological lessons to be learned from grief, although they could also be arrived at by considering several other significant psychological phenomena.

Language: en

Keywords

Evolution; General psychology; Grief; Normativity; Phenomenology; Relational self