Citation

Loureiro F, Garcia-Marques T. Think. Reason. 2018; 24(4): 469-497.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/13546783.2018.1448300

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Research has established that human thinking is often biased by intuitive judgement. The base-rate neglect effect provides such an example, so named because people often support their decisions in stereotypical individuating information, neglecting base-rates. Here, we test the hypothesis that reasoners acknowledge information provided by base-rates and may use individuating information in support of a "rational" decision process.

RESULTS from four experiments show that "base-rate neglecting" occurs when participants acknowledge sample distributions; participants who prefer individuating over base-rate information perceive base-rates as less diagnostic and are more confident in their individuating-based responses; and that posterior probabilities (assigned after all relevant information is considered) predict more individuating-based responses for individuating-preference participants (suggesting a rational process). However, data also show a deeper form of base-rate neglect: even when some participants report to prefer base-rate information, define individuating information as non-diagnostic, and their posterior probabilities suggest otherwise, they still provide individuating-based responses.

Language: en

Keywords

base-rates; intuition; Judgement and decision-making; rationality