Citation

Chappell S. Small Wars Insurg. 2011; 22(3): 495-525.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/09592318.2011.581499

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Strategists are currently debating the efficacy airpower provides in counterinsurgency operations. Through the lens of Colonel John Warden's theory of systemic paralysis, this essay reveals the truth about how airpower was employed in the Mau Mau conflict - a subject that has, until now, been both shrouded in mystery and inaccurately reported. It reveals that the use of airpower in a conflict occurring almost 60 years ago proffers a number of lessons for its use in counterinsurgencies today. Moreover, it discovers that although useful in many respects, Warden's model is somewhat limited for analysing the true use of airpower in counterinsurgencies today and consequently, a more appropriate model is offered for airpower strategists to use in such conflicts.

Language: en

Keywords

airpower; counterinsurgency; Kenya Emergency; Mau Mau; Warden