Citation

Schultz DH, Ito T, Solomyak LI, Chen RH, Mill RD, Anticevic A, Cole MW. Netw. Neurosci. 2018; 3(1): 107-123.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, MIT Press)

DOI

10.1162/netn_a_00056

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

We all vary in our mental health, even among people not meeting diagnostic criteria for mental illness. Understanding this individual variability may reveal factors driving the risk for mental illness, as well as factors driving subclinical problems that still adversely affect quality of life. To better understand the large-scale brain network mechanisms underlying this variability, we examined the relationship between mental health symptoms and resting-state functional connectivity patterns in cognitive control systems. One such system is the fronto-parietal cognitive control network (FPN). Changes in FPN connectivity may impact mental health by disrupting the ability to regulate symptoms in a goal-directed manner. Here we test the hypothesis that FPN dysconnectivity relates to mental health symptoms even among individuals who do not meet formal diagnostic criteria but may exhibit meaningful symptom variation. We found that depression symptoms severity negatively correlated with between-network global connectivity (BGC) of the FPN. This suggests that decreased connectivity between the FPN and the rest of the brain is related to increased depression symptoms in the general population. These findings complement previous clinical studies to support the hypothesis that global FPN connectivity contributes to the regulation of mental health symptoms across both health and disease.

The number of radical Islamist groups fighting in civil wars in Muslim countries has steadily grown over the last twenty years, with such groups outlasting and outperforming more moderate groups. By 2016, Salafi jihadist groups accounted for most of the militant groups in Syria and half of such groups in Somalia. In Iraq, a third of all militant groups were composed of Salafi jihadists. Many analysts argue that the rise of these groups reflects an increase in radical beliefs in Muslim societies. Under certain conditions, however, rebel leaders have strong incentives to embrace an extreme ideology even if they do not believe the ideas that underlie it. When competition is high, information is poor, and institutional constraints are weak, an extremist ideology can help rebel leaders overcome difficult collective-action, principal-agent, and commitment problems. All three of these conditions have been present in the post-2003 civil wars in the Middle East and Africa, and all help explain the emergence and growth of radical groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaida.


© 2018 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Language: en