Citation

Hardcastle VG. J. Med. Philos. 2018; 43(5): 527-546.

Affiliation

Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, Kentucky, USA.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Society for Health and Human Values, Publisher University of Chicago Press)

DOI

10.1093/jmp/jhy022

PMID

30189040

Abstract

In this article, I argue that as we learn more about how we might intervene in the brain in ways that impact human behavior, the scope of what counts as "moral behavior" becomes smaller and smaller because things we successfully manipulate using evidence-based science are often things that fall outside the sphere of morality. Consequently, the argument that we are morally obligated to morally enhance our neighbors starts to fall apart, not because humans should be free to make terrible choices, but because morality is not something subject to such manipulation. To illustrate my argument, I shall use the rise of veteran diversion courts in the United States as a putative instance of an intervention designed to change human behavior for the better. Part of my purpose in working my way through this case study is to demonstrate that many philosophers have the psychology of immoral action wrong.

Language: en