Citation

Feng Y, Huang S, Chen QA, Liu HX, Mao ZM. Transp. Res. Rec. 2018; 2672(1): 1-11.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences USA, Publisher SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0361198118756885

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Existing traffic control systems are mostly deployed in private wired networks. With the development of wireless technology, vehicles and infrastructure devices will be connected through wireless communications, which might open a new door for cyberattackers. It is still not clear what types of cyberattacks can be performed through infrastructure-to-infrastructure and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, whether such attacks can introduce critical failure to the system, and what the impacts are of cyberattacks on traffic operations. This paper investigates the vulnerability of traffic control systems in a connected environment. Four typical elements, including signal controllers, vehicle detectors, roadside units, and onboard units, are identified as the attack surfaces. The paper mainly focuses on attacking actuated and adaptive signal control systems by sending falsified data, which is considered as an indirect but realistic attack approach. The objective of an attacker is to maximize system delay with constraints such as budget and attack intensity. Empirical results show that different attack scenarios result in significant differences in delay, and some ineffective attacks may even improve the system performance. Simulation results from a real-world corridor show that critical intersections, which have a higher impact on network performance, can be identified by analyzing the attack locations. Identification of such intersections can be helpful in designing a more resilient transportation network.

Language: en