Citation

Lindo JM, Padilla-Romo M. J. Health Econ. 2018; 58: 253-268.

Affiliation

University of Tennessee, United States. Electronic address: mpadill3@utk.edu.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.02.002

PMID

29547748

Abstract

This study considers the effects of the kingpin strategy, an approach to fighting organized crime in which law-enforcement efforts focus on capturing the leaders of criminal organizations, on community violence in the context of Mexico's drug war. Newly constructed historical data on drug-trafficking organizations' areas of operation at the municipality level and monthly homicide data allow us to control for a rich set of fixed effects and to leverage variation in the timing of kingpin captures to estimate their effects. This analysis indicates that kingpin captures cause large and sustained increases to the homicide rate in the municipality of capture and smaller but significant effects on other municipalities where the kingpin's organization has a presence, supporting the notion that removing kingpins can have destabilizing effects throughout an organization that are accompanied by escalations in violence. We also find reductions in homicides in municipalities surrounding the municipality where kingpins are captured.

Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Language: en

Keywords

Cartels; Crime; Drugs; Kingpin; Mexico; Violence