Citation

Rogers GO. Int. J. Mass Emerg. Disasters 1992; 10(3): 437-464.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1992, International Sociological Association, International Research Committee on Disasters)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

When people from two distinct cultures attempt to communicate, they often fail to share the fundamental foundation upon which to establish meaningful two-way communication (e.g., language and belief). Risk communication under such circumstances demands special attention and extra effort on the part of people from both cultures to understand and appreciate the risks from a comprehensive perspective that accommodates both sets of interests. This paper examines the communication about risk between the U.S. Army and the native Polynesian cultures in the Pacific Ocean. Specifically, the article analyzes the written record of the proceedings to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 that led up to the shipment of the European Stockpile of unitary chemical weapons to Johnston Atoll that was completed in November 1990. The analysis indicates that while both the native cultures and the Army spoke the same language, the U.S. Army and the native cultures failed to communicate about the risks associated with the movement and destruction of weapons. They failed to establish risk communication dialogue, and never established a common framework for effective risk communication. The people involved from all groups did not establish a shared meaning, and no dialogue was established to clarify meaning as misunderstandings occurred. This condition contributed to increased distrust and undermined the credibility of both perspectives.