Citation

Finegan R. Terrorism Polit. Violence 2016; 28(3): 497-519.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/09546553.2016.1155933

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The British experience in Northern Ireland, particularly the fight against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), is an oft-cited case study in the counter-insurgency (COIN) spectrum and tome of counter-terrorism studies. It is the totality of the British intelligence experience in Northern Ireland, with its successes and challenges, which make it such a valuable case study from which to draw insight to shape contemporary COIN intelligence-based operations. As the conflict was both prolonged and intensified, a multitude of intelligence units from military and law enforcement evolved specifically to counter the effectiveness of PIRA; and to satisfy the desire of the security establishment to intensify information-gathering activities. This article examines the evolution and development of this security intelligence-driven effort that ultimately had the cumulative effect to wear down PIRA's military capability through the focused application of a prolonged and lavishly resourced linked intelligence apparatus as an adjunct of a heavy military and police footprint. Nevertheless, despite Northern Ireland being a relatively small geographical area, the eventual containment of PIRA took years to achieve, demonstrating just how difficult it is to address a committed and determined insurgency. This highlights that a successful COIN strategy is arguably best predicated on the need for "patient" as opposed to "decisive" operations.

Language: en