Citation

Liu H, Wang L, Liu H. Adv. Mech. Eng. 2016; 8(3): 1687814016637521.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, Hindawi Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/1687814016637521

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

An emergency collision-preventing model is proposed for two vehicles driving from opposite directions. To study the impact of drivers' strategies on traffic safety in this model, the relevant knowledge of game theory has been introduced. Based on the drivers' strategies and payoff of every strategy, a game tree and a payoff matrix have been constructed. Mathematical method is applied to identify the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium. The occurrence probability of accidents under the Nash equilibrium is discussed here. The results suggest that under the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, one driver must swerve. Furthermore, the probability of keeping original route is greater when drivers adopt the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium. The results presented in this article will provide some reference for drivers under similar conditions.

Language: en