Citation

Pecht E, Tishler A. Def. Peace Econ. 2015; 28(3): 367-399.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2015, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242694.2015.1101885

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This study develops a dynamic model that integrates military intelligence into the defense capability of the country and the optimal allocation of its government budget. We assert that the effectiveness of the country's military intelligence is contingent on the quality of its human capital, which, in turn, implies a long-term positive relationship between the government's various civilian expenditures and its capacity to achieve a cost-effective intelligence and, hence, military capability. This relationship is developed within a multiple-period arms race model between two rivals. Using this model and stylized data for the Israeli-Syrian arms race, we show that an appropriate budget shift from defense to civilian expenditures during the initial periods of the planning horizon will gradually (over a decade, say) increase the quality of human capital in the country and, thus, the effectiveness of its intelligence, which, in turn, will increase the country's future security and welfare.

Language: en