Citation

Jaegher KD, Hoyer B. Def. Peace Econ. 2016; 27(5): 644-664.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242694.2014.925676

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).

Language: en