Citation

Landmann H, Hess U. Cogn. Emot. 2016; 31(6): 1097-1111.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/02699931.2016.1194258

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

People often get angry when they perceive an injustice that affects others but not themselves. In two studies, we investigated the elicitation of third-party anger by varying moral violation and others' outcome presented in newspaper articles. We found that anger was highly contingent on the moral violation. Others' outcome, although relevant for compassion, were not significantly relevant for anger (Study 1 and Study 2a) or less relevant for anger than for compassion (Study 2b). This indicates that people can be morally outraged: anger can be elicited by a perceived violation of moral values alone, independent of the harm done. A severe negative consequence for others is not necessary to elicit anger.

Language: en