Citation

Stevens GP. Psychiatry Psychol. Law. 2016; 23(3): 413-429.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law, Publisher Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/13218719.2015.1080145

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The role of impulse control disorders on criminal responsibility is currently a controversial issue. With the advent of the DSM-5 various questions arise which specifically relate to the nature and impact of impulse control disorders on criminal responsibility. Further anomalies, in addition, relate to the differences between the classification of impulse control disorders in the DSM-IV-TR as opposed to the recent DSM-5. To date the issue of impulse control disorders has only been addressed in limited criminal case law in South Africa and indicates that courts generally view these disorders as mitigating factors during the sentencing procedure. The focus of this contribution will be to revisit the diagnostic framework for impulse control disorders with specific reference to the criteria provided for in the DSM-5 in order to assess its applicability to a finding of diminished criminal responsibility as provided for in section 78(7) the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and whether it could in certain circumscribed circumstances fulfil the criteria for the defence of pathological criminal incapacity, or more commonly known as the insanity defence. The vital and essential role of the mental health expert within such context will be illustrated.