Citation

Arbis D, Dixit VV, Rashidi TH. Accid. Anal. Prev. 2016; 94: 135-142.

Affiliation

School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of New South Wales, UNSW, Gate 11, Botany Street, H20 CVEN, L1, Room 106, Randwick, NSW 2031, Australia. Electronic address: rashidi@unsw.edu.au.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.aap.2016.05.027

PMID

27289391

Abstract

This study employs game theory to investigate behavioural norms of interaction between drivers at a signalised intersection. The choice framework incorporates drivers' risk perception as well as their risk attitudes. A laboratory experiment is conducted to study the impact of risk attitudes and perception in crossing behaviour at a signalised intersection. The laboratory experiment uses methods from experimental economics to induce incentives and study revealed behaviour. Conflicting drivers are considered to have symmetric disincentives for crashing, to represent a no-fault car insurance environment. The study is novel as it uses experimental data collection methods to investigate perceived risk. Further, it directly integrates perceived risk of crashing with other active drivers into the modelling structure. A theoretical model of intersection crossing behaviour is also developed in this paper. This study shows that right-of-way entitlements assigned without authoritative penalties to at-fault drivers may still improve perceptions of safety. Further, risk aversion amongst drivers attributes to manoeuvring strategies at or below Nash mixed strategy equilibrium. These findings offer a theoretical explanation for interactive manoeuvres that lead to crashes, as opposed to purely statistical methods which provide correlation but not necessarily explanation.

Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Language: en