Citation

Romano A, Mosso CO, Merlone U. Front. Psychol. 2016; 7: e135.

Affiliation

Psychology Department, University of TurinTurin, Italy; Center for Cognitive Science, University of Turin and Polytechnic of TurinTurin, Italy.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, Frontiers Research Foundation)

DOI

10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00135

PMID

26903931

PMCID

PMC4749693

Abstract

In this study, we investigate the role of payoff information and conformity in improving network performance in a traffic dilemma known as the Braess paradox (adding a road to a congested road traffic network could increase overall journey time, and an explanation for instances of improved traffic flow when existing major roads are closed). Our goal is to understand when decisions are guided by selfish motivations or otherwise by social ones. For this purpose, we consider the manipulation of others' choice, public and private monitoring and information on distribution of choices. Data show that when social comparison was not salient, participants were more cooperative. By contrast, cooperativeness of others' choice made participants more competitive leading to traffic and collective performance decrease. The implications of these findings to the literature on social dilemmas are discussed.

Language: en