Citation

Han TA, Pereira LM, Lenaerts T. J. R. Soc. Interface 2015; 12(103): ePub.

Affiliation

AI lab, Computer Science Department, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium MLG, Département d'Informatique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Boulevard du Triomphe CP212, 1050 Brussels, Belgium tom.lenaerts@ulb.ac.be.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2015, Royal Society)

DOI

10.1098/rsif.2014.1203

PMID

25540240

PMCID

PMC4305422

Abstract

When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more favourable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.

Language: en