Citation

Girodo M. Behav. Sci. Law 1998; 16(4): 479-496.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1998, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199823)16:4<479::AID-BSL323>3.0.CO;2-X

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The targeting of selected police officers for proactive undercover investigations is being championed by Internal Affairs (IA) who see it as an innovative corruption prevention program. A critical look at this program suggests that IA's discretionary powers and lack of decisionmaking guidelines for initiating administrative undercover investigations risk adverse legal, social, and ethical consequences. The role of cognitive and organizational factors on police managers' decisions to initiate internal undercover investigations was studied empirically. Three cases of police misconduct involving a shake-down of drug dealers, of extracting sexual favors from a female, and of minor misconduct involving an officer's suspicious acceptance of free meals at a restaurant were reviewed by 217 mid- to upper-level police managers. While 90% of the managers endorsed an undercover investigation in cases of serious misconduct, 45% also supported an undercover probe to see what might be behind an officer accepting free meals. Endorsing an undercover probe for minor misconduct was associated with a police manager's Machiavellian and Bureaucratic attitudes, and was unrelated to familiarity with IA or criminal undercover investigations. Preemptive undercover inquiries to identify problem officers could reduce corruption in an organization, but the present study suggests that the absence of guidelines for establishing when these probes are unacceptable may lead some dedicated IA investigators to stretch the legal and ethical envelopes, and risk going too far with undercover stings. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Language: en