Citation

Wertheimer A. Behav. Sci. Law 1993; 11(3): 239-258.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1993, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1002/bsl.2370110303

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article considers two philosophical questions about coercion and mental disorders: (1) an analytical question, i.e., what is meant by the concept of coercion? (2) a normative question, i.e., what justifies the use of coercion? The article distinguishes between coercion from other forms of power such as inducement, persuasion, and authority. It then considers a range of arguments for the paternalistic use of coercion for the benefit of mentally disordered persons and the use of coercion to restrain mentally disordered dangerous persons. This article rests on the assumption that there is something to be said for an academic division of labour, that empirical research in mental health and the law can benefit from conceptual clarification and the analysis of normative arguments. In this article I distinguish between two importantly different sorts of questions that we can ask about coercion and then offer some answers to those questions in broad strokes.

Language: en