Citation

Rubiny J. Behav. Sci. Law 1988; 6(1): 63-77.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1988, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1002/bsl.2370060106

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The rules governing the civil commitment of mentally ill persons result from complex legislative and judicial processes. In this article an economic approach to the evaluation of commitment laws is presented. A related economic model is applied to the process by which commitment rules are selected and changed. In the economic approach the benefits and costs of civil commitment are specified and analyzed to determine an optimal number of commitments. A graphical model is used to reinforce the conclusions. The distinction between private and social benefits and costs is used to derive the conclusion that some civil commitment is consistent with the economic principle of optimality. Failures in the political process are shown to generate a need for judicial intervention to correct for possible biases toward overcommitment and an inadequate quality of care. An alternative to the economic evaluation of commitment rules, based on the work of Rawls, is also presented.

Language: en