Citation

Engel C. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 2015; 10(3): 361-379.

Affiliation

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods engel@coll.mpg.de.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2015, Association for Psychological Science, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1177/1745691615577865

PMID

25987515

Abstract

In this article, I argue that scientific dishonesty essentially results from an incentive problem; I do so using a standard economic model-the public bad. Arguably, at least in the short run, most scientists would increase their personal utility by being sloppy with scientific standards. Yet, if they do, it becomes more difficult for all scientists to make their voice heard in society, to convince policy makers to assign public funds to academia, and to lead fulfilling academic lives. The nature of the ensuing governance problem (and appropriate policy intervention) hinges on the definition of scientists' utility function. The policy problem is less grave if society attaches disproportionally more weight to severe or widespread violations and if individual scientists do not precisely know in advance when they will quit their academic lives. If most scientists internalize most scientific standards, then the problem is alleviated. However, internalization is immaterial if honorable scientists dislike that others advance their careers by violating those standards. Sanctions are helpful, even if relatively mild. However, it is important to also punish those who do not punish others for breaking the rules or, alternatively, to put some centralized mechanism for vigilance and enforcement into place.

Language: en