Citation

Nejasmic J, Bucher L, Knauff M. Acta Psychol. 2015; 157: 144-154.

Affiliation

Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, Justus Liebig University of Giessen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10 F, 35394 Giessen, Germany. Electronic address: Markus.knauff@psychol.uni-giessen.de.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2015, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.02.008

PMID

25796056

Abstract

Beliefs frequently undergo revisions, especially when new pieces of information are true but inconsistent with current beliefs. In previous studies, we showed that linguistic asymmetries provided by relational statements, play a crucial role in spatial belief revision. Located objects (LO) are preferably revised compared to reference objects (RO), known as the LO-principle. Here we establish a connection between spatial belief revision and grounded cognition. In three experiments, we explored whether imagined physical object properties influence which object is relocated and which remains at its initial position. Participants mentally revised beliefs about the arrangements of objects which could be envisaged as light and heavy (Experiment 1), small and large (Experiment 2), or movable and immovable (Experiment 3). The results show that intrinsic object properties are differently taken into account during spatial belief revision. Object weight did not alter the LO-principle (Experiment 1), whereas object size was found to influence which object was preferably relocated (Experiment 2). Object movability did not affect relocation preferences but had an effect on relocation durations (Experiment 3). The findings support the simulation hypothesis within the grounded cognition approach and create new connections between the spatial mental model theory of reasoning and the idea of grounded cognition.

Language: en