Citation

Raihani NJ, Bshary R. Evolution 2015; 69(4): 993-1003.

Affiliation

Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment, University College London, London, UK, WC1E 6BT. nicholaraihani@gmail.com.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2015, Society for the Study of Evolution, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/evo.12637

PMID

25756463

Abstract

Punishers can benefit from a tough reputation, where future partners cooperate because they fear repercussions. Alternatively, punishers might receive help from bystanders if their act is perceived as just and other-regarding. Third-party punishment of selfish individuals arguably fits these conditions but it is not known whether third-party punishers are rewarded for their investments. Here, we show that third-party punishers are indeed rewarded by uninvolved bystanders. Third-parties were presented with the outcome of a dictator game where the dictator was either selfish or fair and were allocated to one of three treatments where they could choose to do nothing or (i) punish the dictator, (ii) help the receiver or (iii) choose between punishment and helping, respectively. A fourth player ('bystander') then saw the third-party's decision and could choose to reward the third-party or not. Third-parties that punished selfish dictators were more likely to be rewarded by bystanders than third-parties who took no action in response to a selfish dictator. However, helpful third-parties were rewarded even more than third-party punishers. These results suggest that punishment could in principle evolve via indirect reciprocity but also provide insights into why individuals typically prefer to invest in positive actions. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Language: en