Citation

Firestone C, Scholl BJ. Cognition 2014; 136: 409-416.

Affiliation

Department of Psychology, Yale University, Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520-8205, United States(1). Electronic address: brian.scholl@yale.edu.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2014, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.014

PMID

25547483

Abstract

A raft of prominent findings has revived the notion that higher-level cognitive factors such as desire, meaning, and moral relevance can directly affect what we see. For example, under conditions of brief presentation, morally relevant words reportedly "pop out" and are easier to identify than morally irrelevant words. Though such results purport to show that perception itself is sensitive to such factors, much of this research instead demonstrates effects on visual recognition-which necessarily involves not only visual processing per se, but also memory retrieval. Here we report three experiments which suggest that many alleged top-down effects of this sort are actually effects on 'back-end' memory rather than 'front-end' perception. In particular, the same methods used to demonstrate popout effects for supposedly privileged stimuli (such as morality-related words, e.g. "punishment" and "victim") also yield popout effects for unmotivated, superficial categories (such as fashion-related words, e.g. "pajamas" and "stiletto"). We conclude that such effects reduce to well-known memory processes (in this case, semantic priming) that do not involve morality, and have no implications for debates about whether higher-level factors influence perception. These case studies illustrate how it is critical to distinguish perception from memory in alleged 'top-down' effects.

Language: en