Citation

Cebula RJ, Toma MJ. Atl. Econ. J. 2006; 34(1): 3-14.

Affiliation

Armstrong Atlantic State University, U.S.A.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2006, Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1007/s11293-006-6115-9

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Political influence on the use of the nation's war-making resources is considered in this study. Given the 'tax-like' consequences arising from military fatalities, rational political agents may engage in behavior that minimizes the negative electoral consequences resulting from the fatalities. An empirical model of the state-by-state allocation of U.S. Army fatalities resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom is developed and tested. The results suggest that political influence originating in the White House is present in the allocation of fatalities from the military action in Iraq, but that Congressional effects, if any, are much weaker. In particular, population-adjusted fatality rates are lower in states that were highly contested 'battleground' states rich in Electoral College votes in the 2004 Presidential election.