Citation

Lutter R, Morrall JF, Viscusi WK. Econ. Inq. 1999; 37(4): 599-608.

Affiliation

American Enterprise Inst., Washington, DC; US Off Management and Budget, Washington, DC; Harvard Univ, School of Law, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1999, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article develops a model of the conditions under which risk regulations that are too expensive have net adverse health effects. Two principal components of this relationship are the implicit value of life and the income elasticity of risky behaviors. Using new empirical estimates for the income elasticity of many of the most consequential risk-related behaviors, our results imply that a $15 million decrease in income is associated with the loss of an additional statistical life. Regulations that cost more than $15 million per expected life saved will have counterproductive effects on individual mortality.