Citation

Dalton J. Mem. Lit. Philos. Soc. Manchester 1798; 5: 28-45.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1798, The Society)

DOI

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PMID

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Abstract

It hs been observed, that our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, etc. excited by the same object may be very different in themselves, without our being aware of it; and that we may nevertheless converse intelligibly concerning such objects, as if we were certain the impressions made by them on our minds were exactly similar. All that is required for this purpose is that the same object should uniformly make the same impression on each mind and that objects which appeared different to one should be equally so others. It will however scarcely be supposed that any two objects which are every day before us, should appear hardly indistinguishable to one person, in very different to another, without this circumstance immediately suggesting that a difference in their faculties of vision; yet such is the fact, not only with regard to myself, but too many others also, as will appear in the following account.