Citation

Halecker DM. Blutalkohol 2005; 42(2): 93-105.

Affiliation

Europa-Univ. Viadrina Frankfurt, 15230 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2005, International Committee on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety and Bund gegen Alkohol und Drogen im Straßenverkehr, Publisher Steintor Verlag)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The article deals with the following question: Under which conditions does a criminal commit a crime in connection with driving a vehicle, a so called accessory to a crime (section) 69 sec.1 StGB, (section) 44 sec.1 StGB? Current judicature defines it with the following formula "The vehicle must have been used as a means of transport for the preparation, the committing, the exploitation or the covering up of a crime." This, however seems too vague and in contradiction to the wording of (section) 69 sec.1 StGB, (section) 44 sec.1 StGB. A more precise definition should therefore be found in the interest of a uniform, non-contradictory practice of sanctioning. This amounts to more than the decree by the 4th criminal division of the Federal Supreme Court, which demands a withdrawal of driving licences in context of traffic-related danger. In order to prove driving inability a symptomatic traffic-related crime needs to be proven. Furthermore an accessory to a crime should only be declared as such if the driving of the vehicle by the offender happined in the cammitting of the crime and proved with it as an established essential part of the criminal act. The order to ban driving in cases of a so called accessory to a crime as part of the reform of the sanctioning law is to be rejected. Its form to date allows a further definition of the accessory to a crime and heightens the problems related to drawing up insufficient boundaries.