Citation

Windey B, Vermeiren A, Atas A, Cleeremans A. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 2014; 369(1641): 20130282.

Affiliation

ULB Neuroscience Institute (UNI), Université Libre de Bruxelles, , Building C/Campus Erasme CP 602, 808, Route de Lennik, Bruxelles 1070, Belgium.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2014, Royal Society of London)

DOI

10.1098/rstb.2013.0282

PMID

24639587

Abstract

Is our visual experience of the world graded or dichotomous? Opposite pre-theoretical intuitions apply in different cases. For instance, when looking at a scene, one has a distinct sense that our experience has a graded character: one cannot say that there is no experience of contents that fall outside the focus of attention, but one cannot say that there is full awareness of such contents either. By contrast, when performing a visual detection task, our sense of having perceived the stimulus or not exhibits a more dichotomous character. Such issues have recently been the object of intense debate because different theoretical frameworks make different predictions about the graded versus dichotomous character of consciousness. Here, we review both relevant empirical findings as well as the associated theories (i.e. local recurrent processing versus global neural workspace theory). Next, we attempt to reconcile such contradictory theories by suggesting that level of processing is an often-ignored but highly relevant dimension through which we can cast a novel look at existing empirical findings. Thus, using a range of different stimuli, tasks and subjective scales, we show that processing low-level, non-semantic content results in graded visual experience, whereas processing high-level semantic content is experienced in a more dichotomous manner. We close by comparing our perspective with existing proposals, focusing in particular on the partial awareness hypothesis.

Language: en