Citation

Dionne G, Michaud PC, Pinquet J. Res. Transp. Econ. 2013; 43(1): 85-97.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2013, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.retrec.2012.12.006

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations and accidents to promote safe driving. Can these mechanisms improve road safety efficiently? Do they reduce asymmetric information between drivers and insurers and regulators? In other words, is there residual asymmetric information in observed distributions of accidents and infractions? We answer these questions in this article by reviewing recent theoretical and empirical results that rest on various data and methodologies. We present recent tests related to the identification of residual asymmetric information in road safety management and in automobile insurance contracting. We also propose a theoretical analysis of the foundations of point-record driver's licenses observed around the world.