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Citation |
Piliavin I, Gartner R, Thornton C, Matsueda RL. Am. Sociol. Rev. 1986; 51(1): 101-119. |
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Copyright |
(Copyright © 1986, American Sociological Association) |
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DOI |
unavailable |
PMID |
unavailable |
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Abstract |
This study examines the deterrent effect of formal sanctions on criminal behavior. While most research on deterrence assumes a rational-choice model of criminal decision-making, few studies consider all of the major elements of the model. In particular, three critical limitations characterize the empirical literature on deterrence: the failure to establish a causal ordering of sanctions and crime consistent with their temporal ordering; the focus on conventional populations and nonserious criminal acts, which are of less interest to the question of how society controls its members; and the inattention to the return or reward component of the decision-making process. To address these issues, we specify, estimate, and test a rational-choice model of crime on data that were collected on individuals, gathered within a longitudinal design, and derived from three distinct populations of persons at high risk of formal sanction. The results support the reward component of the rational-choice model, but fail to support the cost or deterrent component, as measured by perceived risks of formal sanctions. (abstract Adapted from Source: American Sociological Review, 1986. Copyright © 1986 by the American Sociological Association) |