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Abstract
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VioLit summary:
OBJECTIVE:
The aim of this paper by Spergel was to examine the nature and effectiveness of a community approach to the problem of violent gangs in Chicago.
METHODOLOGY:
The author began with a thorough description of the Crisis Intervention Services Project in Chicago, then turned to a quasi- experimental, aggregate-level analysis of incident and case data to determine the extent to which the intervention program had helped to reduce gang violence. Information for a ten-month period before the program began was compared with data for a ten-month period during the actual program. The target area of the program was on the Northwest side of Chicago, and cut across two police districts - the Fourteenth and the Twenty-fifth. For the evaluation, this area was compared with the remainder of these two districts, and with the Tenth and Thirteenth districts of the city. Data were collected primarily from the Gang Crime Unit records of the Chicago Police Department, which included three types of records: monthly summary reports of gang incidents, including the Part I offenses of homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery, as well as five Part II offenses: simple assault, simple battery, intimidation, gang recruitment and unlawful use of a weapon; detailed case reports of the incidents; and summary gang homicide data, obtained from the Homicide Investigative Unit of the Chicago Police Department. Data from these sources primarily consisted of serious gang crime cases, rather than less serious gang-related offenses committed by individuals, particularly juveniles. The Gang Crime Unit defined gang-related activity as a serious act or threat of violence that involved actual or suspected members of two gangs. For summary police data, the pre-project period ran from October 1982 through July 1983 and the project period included October 1983 through July 1984. Case record information was obtained for the period from October 1982 through May 1983 for the time before the project began, and from October 1983 through May 1984 for the period during the project. Data from October 1982 through May 1984 were used to describe the general character of the gang problem in the four districts. Analysis included examination of frequencies and relative change.
FINDINGS/DISCUSSION:
The author began with a detailed examination of the nature of the Crisis Intervention Services Project. The Project was based upon a number of theories, including the sociocultural disorganization, opportunity, community development or integration, social control and differential association perspectives. The gang was seen as a product of problems in social organization and acculturation of the newcomer population of first-generation Hispanic adolescents and young adults. Assumptions guiding the development of the Project included the belief that the gang represented a substitute institution for individuals who had failed to adequately make the social and cultural transition from school to work, that community organizations had failed to join forces to provide adequate opportunities and social controls, and that gangs and their members were effectively isolated from conventional local institutions. The Project was confined to one politically and socially fragmented lower-class neighborhood with a very high rate of homicide and gang violence, and with about 70,000 residents, primarily from Puerto Rico. About 20 gangs existed within this area, most with multiple ages and geographically defined sections, and each bordered by at least one enemy gang. Local community groups and agencies did not know how to handle the gang problem, and were afraid to deal with it. The immediate goal of the program was simply to reduce levels of gang violence within a community development framework, using community workers and graduate students as field staff, and gaining the help of former gang leaders to act as teaching links between the gangs and the conventional society. The larger purpose was to facilitate the linking of gang members to local conventional culture, opportunity and control structures, including schools, employment, youth agencies, community groups and the police. The strategy of the Project contained four dimensions: crisis intervention and mediation with gangs on the streets; intensive work with individual gang youths referred by the Youth Division of the Police Department; mobilization of local neighborhood groups; and development of an advisory group with local and city participation to oversee the Project, to facilitate communication between the various agencies, and to stimulate the expansion of the model should it be successful. Seventy percent of staff efforts were allocated to the first component of the Project. Intervention methodology included a number of practice principles: systematic communication about gang violence between Project staff, gang members and other youth, and agencies; surveillance and control of gang members; violence dissuasion by police involvement, community mediation and gang discussion; informal street counseling by Project workers and referrals to service agencies; and community development activities such as sporting activities and graffiti- removing expeditions. These activities were directed mainly at youths and young adults aged between 14 and 29. Significant contacts were made with about 400 gang members, 30 or 40 community residents, and about 30 related agency or community organizations each month.
Descriptive findings about the nature of the violence problem were based upon 1,405 reported gang incident cases, with 1,699 identifiable offenders and 1,557 identifiable victims. The offender was usually male (95%-98% of cases) across the four districts, as was the victim (86%-90% of cases). Median age of offender was 17, and of victim was 18 years, with about 62% of gang offenders being over the age of 17. About two-thirds of the offenses were assault and battery, with 9% of total offenses involving robbery and 2% resulting in homicide. Older males were more likely to have been involved in the more violent gang crimes such as aggravated assault, aggravated battery or homicide involving a handgun, whilst the younger members were more likely to have been arrested for simple assault without a weapon or property damage. Two-thirds of the incidents occurred on the streets, 10% in a residence and less than 7% in schools.
Examining summary gang crime incident data, the author found that there was a significant reduction in the rate of increase of Part I crimes in the target area as compared with the nontarget area. The incidence of gang crimes in the target area increased from 64 to 109, whereas in the nontarget area, the rate of increase was almost two and a half times greater, with incidence rising from 43 to 124 crimes. However, since the population of the target area was one-third that of the nontarget area, the scope of the serious gang problem was still greater in the Project's neighborhoods. Little difference was found in patterns of Part II crimes for the two areas, with an increase of 51 to 106 in the target area and 63 to 141 in the nontarget area. Homicide cases rose form 5 to 8 in the target area over the course of the project, and from 1 to 4 in the nontarget area over the ten months, with the tenth district showing a decrease from 7 to 5 cases. However, no significant difference in gang homicide patterns were found during the pre- project and project periods across all four districts. Examining target area Part I and Part II crimes as a proportion of total gang crimes in the combined Fourteenth and Twenty-fifth districts, the author found that Part I proportions declined in the project months, but Part II proportions of total gang crimes increased. In fact, with the completion of the Project, serious (Part I) crimes actually increased again in the target area. Little effect of the Project's completion was seen for Part II crimes. Examining severity of gang crime, the author found that the greatest severity was in the pre-project period in the target area. However, over the course of the Project, this area also had the greatest relative drop in crime severity. Examining aggregate differences in crimes over the Project period for the target area, with intensive Project worker service, compared with the nontarget areas, which had less intensive service for shorter periods of time, few differences were found. However, there were differences in changes of crime incidence between the two areas, with a larger increase of both more and less serious crimes in the area less well served. The author believed that these findings were consistent with patterns obtained using summary data, indicating that the Project was effective in lowering rates of increase of Part I offenses, especially for juveniles, but was less effective for curbing Part II offenses, particularly for adults. Project workers seemed to have had a more positive influence over juvenile gang members than over adults, with the greatest effects being for those receiving intensive services. The proportion of Part I offenses to total gang crimes was also found to be lower in the more intensively served area, with the increase in severity in the highly served area being half the increase in severity in the less served area. The author concluded that the Project was able to achieve modestly positive results, despite having only part-time staff and a fairly short Project duration. The finding of a reduced rate of increase in Part I crimes for the target area was found using multiple sources of data at both aggregate and individuals levels. No evidence was found for the ability of the Project to reduce the general level of delinquency amongst gang offenders.
AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:
The author suggested that future intervention efforts should include the use of full-time neighborhood staff to move in and out of gang territories and to influence gang members to reduce levels of violence. The effectiveness of future efforts could be increased by having closer and better coordinated relationships with schools, probation and parole agencies, and police deterrence efforts. Further development of such efforts should be continued, with evaluation and testing to determine the effectiveness of each program. Also needed are other social strategies, such as the stabilization and mobilization of local populations and their institutions, improved educational opportunities, and improved federal policy providing for increased economic and social opportunities for older youths. Older individuals must be considered and included in prevention planning, with the provision of opportunities to help in the learning and sustaining of conventional behaviors.
EVALUATION:
The author presents a thorough and interesting examination of a local community approach to the problem of violent gangs. The description of the Crisis Intervention Services Project can provide valuable information for the development of new intervention programs, and although the results were only somewhat positive, and actually seemed to suggest that the Project was not very successful, the presentation of the results can inform intervention planners about which strategies to follow and which to avoid. The recommendations for future intervention efforts represent useful knowledge gained from practical experience, and should be taken by researchers and by policy makers as valuable suggestions gleaned from actual trials. Overall, the paper should be considered as a valuable resource for the development of research and intervention in the field of violent gangs. (CSPV Abstract - Copyright © 1992-2007 by the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute of Behavioral Science, Regents of the University of Colorado)
KW - Illinois
KW - Community Based
KW - Gang Intervention
KW - Intervention Program
KW - Juvenile Gang
KW - Juvenile Offender
KW - Juvenile Violence
KW - Program Evaluation
KW - Program Effectiveness
KW - Gang Violence |