Citation

Mendes PS, Carmo J. Law Probab. Risk 2013; 12(3-4): 207-228.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2013, Oxford University Press)

DOI

10.1093/lpr/mgt005

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Causation as an element of a criminal offence is different from the probative difficulties. The empirical laws that are relevant to the proof of causation, as a pure matter of fact, are not discussed here, but only causality as a category of our understanding and a general law of the intelligible world. This general law of causality is equally valid for all result crimes (e.g. homicide, bodily harm, deception offences and criminal damage). According to the European continental theory of conditions, any 'conditio sine qua non' is by itself a cause. Causation is established by the formula of 'conditio' (similar to the so-called 'but for' test in the common law), which corresponds to a counterfactual reasoning. However, that formula is not able to resolve adequately those cases of causal overdetermination where the result occurred by means of actions of multiple, independently intervening agents. A semantic model of the world evolution, based upon ramified temporal logic, may assist the comprehension of causal connections between human actions and the relevant results. At the end of the day, this model allows us to understand that even in situations where no kind of factual uncertainty is present, doubts upon the attribution of causation to specific agents remain. We shall conclude that the attribution of causation is not a natural problem, but a logico-legal one, that has to be dealt with by way of logico-legal criteria. Nevertheless, attribution of causation must be clearly distinguished from objective imputation of proscribed harm.

Language: en