Citation

Di Nucci E. J. Med. Ethics 2013; 39(5): e19-20.

Affiliation

Universität Duisburg-Essen, Institut für Philosophie, Essen 45117, Germany. ezio.dinucci@uni-due.de

Comment On:

J Med Ethics 2013;39(5):261-3.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2013, BMJ Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1136/medethics-2012-100621

PMID

23637456

Abstract

The argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns is a challenge to liberal positions on abortion because it can be considered a reductio of their defence of abortion. Here I defend the liberal stance on abortion by arguing that the argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns on ground of the social, psychological and economic burden on the parents recently put forward by Giubilini and Minerva is not valid; this is because they fail to show that newborns cannot be harmed and because there are morally relevant differences between fetuses and newborns.

Language: en