Citation

Manninen BA. J. Med. Ethics 2013; 39(5): 330-335.

Affiliation

School of Humanities, Arts, and Cultural Studies, Arizona State University, 4701 W Thunderbird Road, Phoenix, AZ 85306, USA. bertha.manninen@asu.edu.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2013, BMJ Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1136/medethics-2012-100656

PMID

23637447

Abstract

In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion.

Language: en