Citation

Gumham D. Legal Stud. 2003; 23(4): 605-622.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2003, Society of Legal Scholars, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1748-121X.2003.tb00230.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper examines the role of retributivism as a principled justification for punishment in the context of the judicial tariff judgments on Myra Hindley and Thompson and Venables. The paper examines the development of retributivist theory from the foundational premise of liberal individualism to its contemporary understanding as a communication of public censure. It is argued that, against the background of legal judgment on tariff issues, retributivism cannot be meaningful in itself. Determining the retributive requirements of justice necessarily involves the construction of a moral narrative made up of both retributivist (retrospective) and consequentialist (prospective) elements.

Language: en