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Abstract
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Excessive self-defense presupposes the existence of a 'self-defense situation': there must objectively have been a situation in which self-defense would have been available. If in such a situation the limits of the necessary defense are exceeded, for example, because the defense reaction was disproportionate, the defendant may nevertheless be excused as long as his actions comply with the requirement of double causation. The excessive action must be directly caused by a 'strong emotion' that was in turn caused by the attack.
In this case, the Supreme Court (Netherlands) for the first time has given a ruling on the question whether a defense of excessive self-defense is possible in a situation in which violence was used on a third person, rather than on the person who had attacked the defendant. In more general terms, the Supreme Court set out that a defense of excessive self-defense could not be conceptually denied a priori in cases where the attack had not come directly from the victim, for example, in situations where the defendant did have 'a part' in the attack or in the imminent threat of an attack, or if there were 'other acts' by the victim, of which it could reasonably be said that they caused the person attacked to retaliate against the victim. The defendant's appeal, however, was dismissed, because the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeal had not found that the victim had acted violently towards the defendant, and that an involvement of the victim in the attack had not been stated by the defendant. Furthermore, it had not been shown by the defendant that there had been other acts that might excuse her on the ground of excessive self-defense. |